Listen to this articleThe State of Rajasthan and
Ors. v. Heem Singh
CIVIL APPEAL No. 3340 OF 2020 decided
on 29th October,2020
Bench: Indira Banerjee, D.Y.
Chandrachud, JJ.
Facts:
The
state approached the Supreme Court against the order of Rajasthan HC of
reinstating the respondent to his service. The respondent in this case was a
police constable appointed in 1992. He was charged for a murder case wherein
during the pendency of criminal trial, disciplinary enquiry was convened
against him. He was acquitted by the Sessions Court on the benefit of doubt,
however, the charges against him stood established and he was dismissed from
his service. He filed an appeal against this dismissal in the High Court. The
High Court granted him reinstatement in service. Aggrieved by such order, the
state approached the Supreme Court.
Issue:
The
Supreme Court considered the following issues:
1. Whether the
acquittal in criminal trial affects the disciplinary proceedings against the
respondent?
2. Whether
the standard of proof of misconduct in disciplinary proceedings differs from
that in a criminal trial?
3. What is
the scope of judicial review over disciplinary matters?
Arguments:
|
Appellant
(State) |
Respondent
|
|
Mr. Ashish Kumar, AAG
appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that: (i) In a
disciplinary enquiry involving a charge of misconduct, the test is whether
the charge is established on a ‘preponderance of probabilities’ unlike in a
criminal trial where the prosecution has to establish their case ‘beyond
reasonable doubt’; (ii) While exercising
judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution against the findings in
a disciplinary enquiry the court cannot re appreciate the evidence in the
manner of an appellate court, and so long as the finding of misconduct is
based on some evidence, no interference is warranted. (iii)
The High Court has failed to ascribe adequate weight to the orders in the
disciplinary proceedings: the order dated 11 December 2003 pursuant to
departmental proceedings; the order dated 17 June 2005 of the Inspector General
of Police exercising appellate powers, and the order dated 29 August 2008 in
review proceedings passed by the Home Department. |
Mr. Jasmeet Singh,
learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that: (i) The
departmental enquiry was concluded in violation of the rules governing the
enquiry. All the orders in the disciplinary enquiry were based on the
examination-in-chief of an alleged eye-witness, PW1 Jodh Singh while ignoring
that his deposition was completely demolished in the course of the cross-examination. (ii) Since the
alleged crime took place outside the scope of service, it was incumbent upon
the department to place reliance on the entire record of the Sessions trial
in which the respondent was acquitted. The departmental enquiry is based on a
selective examination of the records of the Sessions Court. (iii) The
entire evidence on record would demonstrate that the respondent was not even
remotely connected with the murder of Bhanwar Singh. |
Held:
With regards to issue
(1), the court held that though the acquittal brought finality to
the question as to whether the respondent had committed the offence of murder
punishable under the Penal Code, however, the disciplinary enquiry stood on a
broader footing. The court remarked that the disciplinary proceedings related
not merely to the involvement of the respondent in the murder, but to the
violation of service rules and the impact of his conduct on the image of the
police force. The
disciplinary enquiry was not governed by proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by
the rules of evidence that governed the criminal trial. Hence, the verdict of the
criminal trial did not conclude the disciplinary enquiry.
With regards to issue (2), the court held that the standard of proof in disciplinary
proceedings is different from that in a criminal trial. In Suresh Pathrella v.
Oriental Bank of Commerce, (2006) 10 SCC 572, a two judge Bench held that the
proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. Furthermore, the court asserted that the involvement of a member of the police service in a
heinous crime, if established, has a direct bearing on the confidence of
society in the police and in this case, on his ability to serve as a member of
the force. The State can legitimately assert that it is entitled to proceed
against an employee like respondent, for a breach of the standard of conduct
which is expected of a member of the state police service.
With regards to issue (3), the court observed that in exercising
judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum.
The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is
permissible. The court held that judicial craft lies in
maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been
termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere
recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To
determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some
evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. But this does
not allow the court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary
enquiry. To do so would offend the first principle i.e. the rule of restraint.
The court thus set aside the direction of the Division Bench for reinstatement. In
exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court
directed that the cessation from service will notionally take place on the
respondent completing minimum qualifying service.